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FROM ANASTASOFF TO HART TO WEST'S FEDERAL
APPENDIX: THE GROUND SHIFTS UNDER NO-
CITATION RULES
Stephen R. Barnett*
I. INTRODUCTION: A FAST-PACED YEAR
Last year's mini-symposium on unpublished opinions'
seems to have unleashed a wave of further developments. The
fast-breaking events include these:
1. Judge Richard S. Arnold's opinion for the Eighth Circuit
in Anastasoff v. United States,2 holding-until vacated as
moot-that the circuit's rule denying precedential effect to
unpublished opinions exceeded the Article III judicial power,
* Elizabeth J. Boalt Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. I thank the
several federal circuit judges, the many court officials, and the West Group representative
who spoke to me for this essay. I also thank Bob Berring for helpful comments, Florence
McKnight for research assistance, and the reference staff of the Boalt Hall Library.
1. Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and "No Citation" Rules, 3 J. App. Prac. &
Process 169 (2001).
2. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
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has been ringingly answered by Judge Alex Kozinski's opinion
for the Ninth Circuit in Hart v. Massanari.3
2. The American Bar Association's House of Delegates has
declared that the practice of some federal circuits in "prohibiting
citation to or reliance upon their unpublished opinions" is
"contrary to the best interests of the public and the legal
profession."4 The ABA urges the federal appellate courts to
"make their unpublished opinions available through print or
electronic publications [and] publicly accessible media sites," as
well as to "permit citation to relevant unpublished opinions." 5
3. In a startling action that drains the meaning from the
term "unpublished" opinion, the West Group in September
2001 launched its Federal Appendix.6 This is a new case-
reporter series in West's National Reporter System that consists
entirely of "unpublished" opinions from the federal circuit
courts of appeals (except, currently, the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits).7 By late April 2002, West had published twenty-seven
volumes of the Federal Appendix, averaging some 400 cases per
volume, and was expecting to report some 12,000 cases per
3. 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001). Meanwhile, two federal appeals cases in which
panels refused to follow unpublished opinions have drawn pro-Anastasoff dissents.
Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2001), petition for reh. en
banc denied, 256 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, Jones & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting);
Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med.., Educ. & Research Found., 277 F.3d 1361, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting). See infra n. 72.
4. American Bar Association, Sections of Litigation, Criminal Justice, Tort and
Insurance Practice and Senior Lawyers Division, Report to the House of Delegates,
Resolution No. 01A 115 (Aug. 1, 2001).
5. Id.
6. See West Group Press Release, West Group Launches New National Reporter
System Publication for Unpublished Decisions (Sept. 5, 2001) (copy on file with author).
The press release explained that "many legal researchers want access to unpublished
opinions because they often include relevant fact situations and particular applications of
settled law." Id. It stated that "all U.S. Court of Appeals unpublished decisions" issued
from January 1, 2001, would be included, and that each case would "receive full West
Group editorial enhancements, be given a new citation and be made available in print in the
West's Federal Appendix volumes, on CD-ROM and on Westlaw." Id.
7. In line with their policy of denying online access to their unpublished opinions
(while allowing citation of them), see infra nn. 12, 27-28 and accompanying text, the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits make available to West only the information needed for the
Decisions Without Published Opinions tables in the Federal Reporter. Telephone
Interviews with West Group representative (Jan. 10, 2002, Mar. 4, 2002, May 3, 2002).
(All interviews for this essay with judges, court personnel, and West Group representatives
were conducted on the understanding that the sources' identities would not be disclosed.
Redacted notes of each interview are on file with the author.)
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year. The cases in the Federal Appendix are supplied with
headnotes, indexed to West's Key Number system, garnished
with the other "editorial enhancements" of West's reporting
system, and christened with their own citation form: " Fed.
Appx. _." Except for its citation restrictions,9 the Federal
Appendix looks, reads, and quacks like a book of "published"
case reports. If nothing else, West's action is requiring that
definitions of "unpublished" be radically revised.10
4. The most significant move by the federal courts has
come from the District of Columbia Circuit. Effective January 1,
2002, that court abandoned its no-citation rule and declared that
all unpublished opinions issued on or after that date "may be
cited as precedent." " Meanwhile, the Third Circuit has become
8. Telephone Interview with West Group representative (Mar. 4, 2002); see also e.g.
West's Federal Appendix, vol. 27 (West Group 2002).
9. West runs a disclaimer on each volume's title page and on the report of each case,
stating that the cases "have not been selected for publication in the Federal Reporter." This
implies, misleadingly, that West has made some sort of case-by-case selection, and it fails
to state the central point that the cases are all "unpublished." However, the title-page
notice does advise readers to "consult local court rules to determine when and under what
circumstances these cases may be cited," and each case bears a notice reciting whatever
formula the issuing circuit employs to designate its unpublished opinions and restrict their
usage. See e.g. U.S. v. Martini, 27 Fed. Appx. 1 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[NOT FOR
PUBLICATION-NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]").
10. The First Circuit reacted with instant alarm, hurriedly amending its rules to redefine
a "published opinion" as "one that appears in the ordinary West Federal Reporter series
(not including West's Federal Appendix)." 1st Cir. Interim Loc. R. 36 (b)(2)(F) (Sept. 24,
2001) (emphasis in original). See also 8th Cir. R. 28A(i) (amended Jan. 16, 2002)
("Unpublished decisions are decisions which a court designates for unpublished status").
The need for other rule-makers to take similar steps is suggested in Michael Hannon, A
Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. App.
Prac. & Process 199, 205-206 (2001) ("In regard to federal circuit court opinions,
'unpublished' appears to mean that the opinion is not available in print.").
11. D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(12)(B). A companion rule advises counsel, however, that "a
panel's decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no
precedential value in that disposition." D.C. Cir. R. 36(c)(2). The D.C. Circuit
simultaneously amended its Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures to caution that
while the new rule "makes a major change in the Court's practice," and while counsel
"will now be permitted to argue that an unpublished disposition is binding precedent on a
particular issue," the court's decision to issue an unpublished disposition "means that the
Court sees no precedential value in that disposition.... i.e., the order or judgment does not
add anything to the body of law already established and explained in the Court's published
precedents." D.C. Cir., Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 42, 52 (as amended
through Jan. 1, 2002). Further, "counsel should recognize that the Court believes that its
published precedents already establish and adequately explain the legal principles applied
in the unpublished disposition, and that there is accordingly no need for counsel to base
their arguments on unpublished dispositions." Id. at 41.
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the eleventh of the thirteen federal circuits to post its
unpublished opinions online and make them available to legal
publishers.2
5. The action by the D.C. Circuit tips the balance in the
federal courts against no-citation rules. Of the thirteen circuits,
there remain only five-the First, 3 Second, 4 Seventh,
5 Ninth, 16
Asked why they made the rule change, two D.C. Circuit judges called the move
"long overdue" and mentioned variously the Federal Appendix, the Anastasoff opinion, the
broad availability of unpublished opinions through online sources and elsewhere, and that
"we don't like secret law." Telephone Interviews with D.C. Cir. judges (Jan. 11, 2002,
Feb. 28, 2002).
12. See 3d Cir. Press Release (Dec. 5, 2001) (announcing that as of January 2, 2002, all
court opinions in counseled cases "will be posted on the court's web site ... and available
for dissemination by legal publishers"; the court, however, will continue to observe
Internal Operating Procedure (I.O.P.) 5.8, "which provides that the court will not cite to
non-precedential opinions as authority") (emphasis in original) (available at
<http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/> (accessed Apr. 4, 2002; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process)). This surrender to the online world was an about-face for
the Third Circuit. Until this year it had been "generally cons idered that the Third, Fifth and
Eleventh circuits have banned electronic dissemination of unpublished opinions, and these
cases are neither added to Westlaw or LEXIS nor available from the courts' websites."
Hannon, supra n. 10, at 211. The Third Circuit clarified its new procedures in late
February, announcing that opinions in counseled cases will now be labeled either
"precedential" or "not precedential," and that "the court will continue to observe its
practice of not citing not precedential opinions as authority." 3d Cir. Press Release (Feb.
21, 2002) (available at <http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov>) (accessed Apr. 14, 2002; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process)).
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, lost heart. After announcing that it would put
its unpublished opinions online, in late January 2002 it reconsidered and decided to
maintain the status quo. Telephone interview with Fifth Cir. official (Feb. 1, 2002). See
also 5th Cir. Website FAQ ("Only opinions designated for publication (published
opinions) are put on our website.") (emphasis in original) (available at <http://www.ca5.
uscourts.gov> (accessed Mar. 25, 2002; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process)).
13. See 1st Cir. R. 36(b)(2)(F) (unpublished opinions may be cited "only in related
cases").
14. See 2d Cir. R. 0.23 (citation of written statements attached to summary orders
prohibited, since they "do not constitute formal opinions of the court and are unreported or
not uniformly available to all parties").
15. See 7th Cir. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) (unpublished orders "shall not be cited or used as
precedent" ).
16. See 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (unpublished dispositions "not binding precedent" and "may
not be cited") A provisional rule in effect for the thirty-month period ending December 31,
2002, allows citation of unpublished dispositions in petitions for rehearing or rehearing en
banc and in requests to publish an opinion, but only for the purpose of showing conflict
among published and/or unpublished dispositions. Id. R. 36-3(b)(iii).
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and Federal' 7-that ban citation of unpublished opinions (except,
of course, for related-case uses such as res judicata). The other
eight circuits discourage citation of unpublished opinions,
typically calling it "disfavored," but grudgingly allow it. They
do this generally under one of two formulas-(1) that the
opinions may be cited as "precedent" or for "precedential
value" (the Fourth, 8 Sixth,'9 and D.C.20 Circuits), or (2) that they
are "not precedent" but may be cited for their "persuasive"
value ( the Fifth,2' Eighth,22 Tenth,23 and Eleventh24 Circuits). The
Third Circuit, a loner, uses no formula but allows citation.25
17. See Fed. Cir. R. 47.6(b) (opinion or order "designated as not to be cited as
precedent ... must not be employed or cited as precedent").
18. See 4th Cir. R. 36(c) (citation of unpublished opinions "disfavored," but "[i]f
counsel believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished disposition. .. has precedential value in
relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no published opinion that would serve
as well, such disposition may be cited").
19. See 6th Cir. R. 28(g) (citation of unpublished decisions "disfavored," but "[i]f a
party believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished disposition has precedential value in
relation to a material issue in a case, and that there is no published opinion that would serve
as well, such decision may be cited").
20. See D.C. Cir. R. 28(c) (unpublished orders entered before January 1, 2002, "are not
to be cited as precedent," but ones entered on or after January 1, 2002, "may be cited as
precedent"). See also D.C. Cir. R. 36(c)(2) (panel's decision to issue unpublished
disposition "means that the panel sees no precedential value in that disposition"); D.C.
Circuit Handbook, supra n. I1, at 42, 52.
21. The Fifth Circuit uses both formulas, depending on when the opinion was issued.
See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3 (unpublished opinions issued before January 1, 1996, "are
precedent," but "because every opinion believed to have precedential value is published,"
unpublished opinions "normally" should not be cited); 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4 (unpublished
opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are "not precedent"; such opinions "may,
however, be persuasive," and may be cited).
22. See 8th Cir. R. 28A(i) (unpublished opinions "are not precedent and parties
generally should not cite them," but parties may do so if the opinion "has persuasive value
on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve as well").
23. See 10th Cir. R. 36.3 (unpublished decisions "are not binding precedents," and
their citation is "disfavored"; but an unpublished decision may be cited if it has
"persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a
published opinion" and it would "assist the court in its disposition").
24. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (unpublished opinions "are not considered binding
precedent," but "may be cited as persuasive authority"); see also 11th Cir. R. 36-3, I.O.P. 5
(stating that "[o]pinions that the panel believes to have no precedential value are not
published," and that "[r]eliance on unpublished opinions is not favored by the court").
25. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.8 (explaining that "the court by tradition does not cite its
unpublished opinions as authority"); 3d Cir. Press Release, Dec. 5, 2001 ("The court will
continue to observe Internal Operating Procedure 5.8, which provides that the court will
not cite to non-precedential opinions as authority." (emphasis in original)). In stating
carefully that "the court" does not cite to unpublished opinions, the Third Circuit tacitly
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The balance tips toward citability in numbers of cases as
well. The citable unpublished cases from the eight territorial
circuits that allow citation total some 15,000 per year, while the
noncitable cases from the four territorial circuits that ban
citation total about half that.2" It should be noted, however, that
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which each put out more than
3,000 unpublished opinions per year, withhold those opinions
from online distribution (or West's Federal Appendix), while
schizophrenically allowing them to be cited. 7 It appears,
nonetheless, that these opinions are not effectively suppressed
and in fact are cited. 28
6. While this essay focuses on the federal courts, there is
noteworthy movement in the state courts as well. In what would
be a seismic shift, the Texas Supreme Court has tentatively
decided to lift the "Do Not Publish" stamp now affixed to some
eighty-five percent of the opinions of the Texas court of appeals
and to "remove prospectively any prohibition against the
citation of opinions as authority. 9 Meanwhile, California's
allows lawyers to do so. Telephone Interview with 3d Cir. official (Jan. 9, 2002) (First
Amendment cited as reason for the policy).
26. Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 2001, tbl. S-3 (available at
<http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus200l/tables/sO3SepOO.pdf> (accessed April 20, 2002;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process)). The eight "citable" circuits
have 14,806 unpublished cases, while the four noncitable circuits have 7,114. Id. (The
Federal Circuit is not included in Table S-3, so the number of unpublished cases it issues is
not available. Telephone Interview with Fed. Cir. official (Jan. It, 2002). The statistics
show a total of 1,500 case dispositions for the Federal Circuit, but do not indicate how
many of them are unpublished. See Judicial Business, at tbl. B-8.)
27. See supra nn. 7, 12, 21, 24.
28. An official in the Fifth Circuit reports that the unpublished opinions of that court
are not uncommonly cited and that lawyers obtain them principally in two ways: (1)
Lawyers who practice in a given area (immigration law, for example) have their own
"networks" within which relevant unpublished opinions are passed around and even bound
into mini-collections; law offices such as those of the U.S. Attorney and Public Defender
also collect opinions relevant to their work; and (2) the opinions are available in
chronological binders in the circuit's library. Telephone Interview with 5th Cir. official
(Mar. 15, 2002); see also Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d at 318 n. I
(discussing unpublished Fifth Circuit cases). In the Eleventh Circuit, two court officials
state that unpublished opinions are cited. One reports that "some of the larger law offices
keep track" of the opinions, in some cases "running their own data banks." The other
notes that the opinions are available in the court clerk's office and that unpublished
opinions are commonly cited in briefs filed with that circuit. Telephone Interviews with
11th Cir. officials (Jan. 11, 2002, Mar. 15, 2002).
29. Texas Supreme Court, Comparison of Advisory Committee TRAP
Recommendations and Supreme Court's Tentative Conclusions 12-15 (Jan. 14, 2002)
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court of appeal, which brands some ninety-four percent of its
opinions "unpublished," 3 0 has begun posting all its unpublished
opinions on the court's website.3 Citation is still prohibited, but
the technological (and psychological) infrastructure is in place
for possible pressure to follow a Texas lead.
Against the backdrop of these developments, I shall in this
Essay first appraise the face-off between Judge Arnold and
Judge Kozinski in Anastasoff and Hart, setting their
disagreement about "precedent" against the spectrum of
meanings which that word may convey. I will argue that Judge
Kozinski's opinion in Hart, for all its scholarly brilliance,
demonstrates, in part, something different from what he may
have intended. I will then consider Judge Kozinski's arguments
against no-citation rules, finding them inadequate, and will
conclude by considering the degree of "precedential" force that
unpublished opinions should be accorded in the federal courts.
(addressing Rule 47.7) (available at <http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/
Committee/> (accessed Mar. 26, 2002; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process)). The court was divided on the issue of retroactivity and sought further guidance
from its Advisory Committee, with a final decision expected by summer of 2002.
Telephone Interviews with Tex. Sup. Ct official (Jan. 10, 2002, Feb. 1, 2002, Mar. 28,
2002).
The debate over unpublished opinions has become something of a public issue in
Texas, with several of the state's leading newspapers editorializing in favor of the proposed
rule change. See e.g. Publish or Perish: Unpublished Appellate Court Opinions Corrode
Texas Law, Houston Chron. 2C (Dec. 9, 2001); Court Blackout: Too Many Opinions Are
Kept Under Wraps, Dallas Morning News 14A (Dec. 31, 2001); Court Opinions Should
Become Public, San Antonio Express-News 2G (Dec. 16, 2001) (characterizing no-citation
rules as "unfair to Texans who must pick their judges in the voting booth"); Editorial,
Forth Worth Star-Telegram 10 (Dec. 17, 2001) ("One would think that, any time a Texas
appeals court issues a ruling, anyone could find it in the law books and rely on it to make
an argument in one's own case. One would be wrong.").
30. See Cal. R. Ct. 977(a); Jud. Council of Cal., Admin. Off. of the Cts., 2001 Court
Statistics Report, Courts of Appeal, tbl. 9 (available at <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/>
(accessed Mar. 21, 2002; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process)).
31. See Unpublished Opinions (available at <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/
nonpub.htm/> (accessed May 8, 2002; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process)).
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II. ANASTASOFF, HART, AND THE SPECTRUM OF PRECEDENT
A. Anastasoff and Hart
Amid the continued controversy over unpublished opinions
and the uses of precedent, the debate between Judge Arnold in
Anastasoff and Judge Kozinski in Hart focuses, perhaps
surprisingly, on one facet of this subject. These two intellectual
heavyweights go to the mat over whether Article III requires that
all decisions of the federal courts of appeals be regarded as
"binding precedents." Judge Arnold finds from his examination
of eighteenth-century sources that " [t]he Framers thought that,
under the Constitution, judicial decisions would become binding
precedents in subsequent cases."32 He thus concludes-given the
"law-of-the-circuit" rule, under which a panel's decision cannot
be overruled by another panel, but only by the court en banc 33-
that his panel was required to follow an unpublished Eighth
Circuit decision.34 Judge Arnold further concludes that the
Eighth Circuit's Rule 28A(i), stating that unpublished opinions
"are not precedent," purports to "expand the judicial power
beyond the bounds of Article III, and is therefore
unconstitutional."35
In Hart, Judge Kozinski-who, like Judge Arnold, had
previously written extra-judicially on this subject 36 -seized on
the opportunity presented by a lawyer who cited an unpublished
Ninth Circuit opinion and then defended his violation of the
court's no-citation rule by arguing that the rule was
unconstitutional under Anastasoff. Meeting Judge Arnold on his
chosen ground of eighteenth-century history, Judge Kozinski
offers a scholarly account that refutes Anastasoff s claim of a
32. 223 F.3d at 902.
33. Id. at 904; see n. 41 infra and accompanying text.
34. The issue was the scope of the "mailbox rule" for filing federal tax refund claims.
See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d 898.
35. 223 F.3d at 900. Judge Arnold's opinion was vacated as moot when the
Government acceded to the contrary decision of another circuit. Anastasoff v. United
States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
36. See Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This! 20 Cal. Law. 43
(June 2000); Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. App. Prac. &
Process 219 (1999).
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historically-based constitutional requirement of binding
precedent. The modem concept of binding precedent required
two conditions, reliable case reports and a settled hierarchy of
courts, that were not in place until at least the mid-nineteenth
century, Judge Kozinski points out." When the Constitution was
drafted, then, it was "emphatically not the case that all decisions
of common law courts were treated as precedent binding on
future courts unless distinguished or rejected."3 8  Judge
Kozinski's panel thus declines to follow Anastasoff and holds
the Ninth Circuit's no-citation rule constitutional.39
Fascinating as this historical duel is, the opinions by Judge
Arnold and Judge Kozinski deal with only one variety of
precedent. That word can mean many things; "binding"
precedent is only one of those things, and arguably not the most
important for the current debate. Although the categories
overlap and the lines blur, one can identify at least five species
of precedent that may be relevant to this discussion.
B. The Spectrum of Precedent
1. Binding precedent. "Binding" precedent is what the
shouting is about in Anastasoff and Hart. It is the rule, as stated
by Judge Kozinski, that a court's decision "must be followed by
courts at the same level and lower within a pyramidal judicial
hierarchy."4° By virtue of the words "at the same level," this
formulation incorporates in the concept of binding precedent the
law-of-the-circuit rules, existing in all circuits, which mandate
that only the en banc court can overrule a panel decision.4
37. 266 F.3d at 1164 n. 10 (quoting R.M.W. Dias, Jurisprudence (2d ed., Butterworth
1964)).
38. Id. at 1167.
39. The court also held that the rule (9th Cir. R. 36-3) had been violated, but declined
to impose sanctions in view of the attorney's good-faith constitutional challenge. 266 F.3d
at 1180. Attorneys who henceforth cite unpublished cases in the Ninth Circuit presumably
cannot expect such leniency, at least not from Judge Kozinski. But cf U.S. v. Rivera-
Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (court asks counsel to submit list of
unpublished opinions superseded by its decision and cites them in its opinion, "[t]o avoid
even the possibility that someone might rely upon them").
40. 266 F.3d at 1168.
41. See e.g. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1171 ("[T]he first panel to consider an issue sets the law
not only for all the inferior courts in the circuit, but also future panels of the court of
appeals."); U.S. v. Humphrey, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 6984 (6th Cir. 2002), at *71 ("It is
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Accordingly, an unpublished opinion recognized under a
particular circuit's rules as "precedent" -which can happen in
the D.C. Circuitn'-and possibly one recognized as having
"precedential value"-which can happen in the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits43-my become binding precedent for other
panels in that circuit.
2. Overrulable precedent. "Overrulable" precedents are
decisions the court ordinarily will follow under stare decisis, but
may overrule if sufficient reasons present themselves. The
category typically includes earlier decisions of the same court.
Some kinds of precedents, even from the same court, can be
overruled more readily than others. The Supreme Court's
summary dispositions, for example, receive "less deference"
from the Court than its decisions made "after briefing,
argument, and a written opinion." 45 Under the law-of-the-circuit
rule, on the other hand, overruling is restricted; one circuit panel
cannot overrule another panel's decision.
3. "Precedent," or "precedential value." In the third
category are simply "precedents," or cases having "precedential
value." These are omnibus terms whose meaning can run the
axiomatic that a court of appeals must follow the precedent of prior panels within its own
circuit."); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules,
3 J. App. Prac. & Process 287, 288 n. 5 (2001).
42. See supra nn. 11, 20. The D.C. Circuit expressly permits lawyers to argue that an
unpublished disposition is "binding precedent," or at least "precedent." See supra n. 11.
In the Fifth Circuit, unpublished opinions issued before January 1, 1996, likewise "are
precedent." See supra n. II and text accompanying n. 20.
43. See supra nn. 18, 19.
44. The Sixth Circuit apparently disagrees. See Humphrey, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
6984 at * 71 ("unpublished decision[s] with no binding effect"; "unpublished opinions are
not controlling precedent") (citing U.S. v. Ennenga, 263 F.3d 499, 504 (6th Cir. 2001);
Salamalekis v. Commr., 221 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 2000)). The explanation could be that in all
these cases the court rejected the claim that the particular unpublished opinion cited had
precedential value; the cases, however, are categorical in what they say about unpublished
opinions. The cases do all use qualifying terms such as "binding" or "controlling"
precedent. So the point may be that the Sixth Circuit does not regard "precedential value"
as translating into "binding" precedent or as constituting the law of the circuit.
45. See e.g. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916, 920 n. * (1990) ("The Court
gives less deference to summary dispositions ...."); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
390 n. 9 (1979) ("not entitled to the same deference given a ruling after briefing, argument,
and a written opinion"); Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman, Stephen M. Shapiro &
Kenneth S. Geller, Supreme Court Practice 216 (7th ed., BNA 1993) ("It thus seems fair
to say that the whole Court agrees that summary affirmances are entitled to some weight,
but to less than fully articulated decisions.").
ANASTASOFF TO HART TO WEST'S FEDERAL APPENDIX
gamut from binding precedent to mere citable precedent
(discussed shortly). Of the eight circuits that allow citation of
unpublished opinions, one-the D.C. Circuit-permits their
citation "as precedent,, 46 while two-the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits-allow that unpublished opinions may have
"precedential value" (which may or may not be the same
thing) .47
4. Persuasive value. A fourth category comprises cases
citable for their "persuasive value." This somewhat elusive term
evidently means persuasive force independent of any
precedential claim; the decision must persuade on its own
argumentative merits, without regard for its status as a precedent
or for any notions of stare decisis.48 The problem is, of course,
that the concepts of precedent and persuasiveness are difficult to
disentangle. The habit of stare decisis is hard-wired into the
brains of common law judges. And, other things being equal, it
is easier to follow a lead than to blaze one's own trail.
Nonetheless, as Judge Kozinski stresses in Hart, "persuasive"
authority is a concept familiar to judges and lawyers.49 Of the
eight circuits that allow citation of unpublished opinions, four-
the Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fifth-provide that such
opinions are "not precedent," or "not binding precedent," but
that they may be cited for their "persuasive value."5 ° This
presumably has the important effect of denying these opinions
the force conferred by the law-of-the-circuit rule, thus allowing
46. See supra n. 11 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit also regards unpublished
opinions issued before January 1, 1996, as "precedent." See supra n. 21.
47. See supra nn. 18, 19,44.
48. The idea resembles the administrative-law concept of "Skidmore deference," under
which an agency's informal interpretations of its statute are "'entitled to respect,' . .. but
only to the extent [they] have the power to persuade."' Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); see
also U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). Justice Jackson stated in Skidmore
that the weight accorded to the administrative judgment in a particular case "will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 323 U.S. at 140.
49. "[C]ommon law judges knew the distinction between binding and persuasive
precedent. The vast majority of precedents at common law were considered more or less
persuasive." 266 F.3d at 1165 n. 13.
50. See supra nn. 21-24.
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them to be overruled-or simply rejected as unpersuasive-by
subsequent panels of the same circuit.
5. Citable precedent. Last comes citable precedent. This
term means only that the case may be cited, with the weight to
be given it left open. Minimal as the concept may seem, the
ability to cite a case is, of course, precisely what is at stake in
no-citation rules. The ABA's recent resolution, for example,
urges only that the federal appeals courts " [p]ermit citation" to
unpublished opinions.5' Given the habit of stare decisis and the
attraction of following a path already broken, I would say that, if
opinions may be cited, they will be followed more often than if
they may not be. Judge Kozinski memorably disagrees. 2 Be that
as it may, the concept of citability may have important symbolic
value in a system of law based on precedent, value essential to
respect for the law and to the rule of law itself. Judge Kozinski
in Hart has usefully articulated the rationale for citability,
grounding it on a court's obligation to "acknowledge[] and
consider[]" prior decisions.53
Precedent thus is a rich palette. In depicting unpublished
opinions as "precedents," one needs to consider the broad range
of colors that may be applied.
III. THE BACKHANDED IMPACT OF HART: No-CITATION RULES AT
THE BAR OF THE COMMON LAW
The key issue today is not whether unpublished opinions
must be binding precedents; it is whether they may be cited at
all. The central split among the circuits, for example, is not over
binding precedent. Of the eight circuits that permit citation, only
one (the D. C. Circuit) explicitly contemplates "binding
precedent"; two (the Tenth and Eleventh) state that unpublished
opinions are not "binding precedent[s]"; while another two (the
Fifth and Eighth) deny that they are even "precedents." 54 The
51. See supra nn. 4-5 and accompanying text.
52. "Citing a precedent is, of course, not the same as following it; 'respectfully
disagree' within five words of 'learned colleagues' is almost a cliche." Hart, 266 F.3d at
1170.
53. "So long as the earlier authority is acknowledged and considered, courts are
deemed to have complied with their common law responsibilities." Id. at 1170.
54. See supra nn. 11, 20-24.
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battle is over citability. Judicial defenders circle their wagons
around the no-citation feature of the rules,55 while many critics
aim their arrows at only that feature.5 6 Emblematic of the debate
is Judge Arnold's widely-quoted comment in Anastasoff:
"[S]ome forms of the non-publication rule even forbid citation.
Those courts are saying to the bar: 'We may have decided this
question the opposite way yesterday, but this does not bind us
today, and, what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did
yesterday."'"
Judge Kozinski in Hart, while rejecting the claim that
unpublished opinions must be binding precedents, goes further
and upholds the Ninth Circuit's rule banning citation of those
opinions." This issue indeed was presented; the validity of the
no-citation rule, as applied to a citation carrying no claim of
binding authority, was the question raised by the facts of Hart.59
Judge Kozinski concentrated, however, on the binding-authority
55. E.g. Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra n. 36 at 43; Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of
Unpublished Opinions, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 177, 196 (1999).
56. E.g. Katsh & Chachkes, supra n. 41; Stephen R. Barnett, "Unpublished" Judicial
Opinions in the United States: Law Or Not? 2 European Bus. Org. L. Rev. 429, 434-437
(2001). The claim that no-citation rules violate the First Amendment by prohibiting
litigants from telling the court about a prior court decision, see Katsh & Chachkes, supra
n. 41, at 289, draws support from Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
The Court there struck down, under the First Amendment, a Congressional prohibition
against the use of LSC funds in cases involving an effort to "amend or otherwise challenge
existing welfare law." Id. at 537. Calling the ban "inconsistent with the proposition that
attorneys should present all the reasonable and well-grounded arguments necessary for
proper resolution of the case," the Court declared that the enactment under review, in its
attempt to "prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the
courts .... prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper
exercise of the judicial power." Id. at 545.
57. 233 F.3d at 904.
58. 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (unpublished dispositions "are not binding precedent" and "may
not be cited").
59. The attorney whose citation of an unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion precipitated
Judge KQzinski's ruling in Hart was not citing that opinion as precedent, at least not in the
sense of asking the court to follow it, but was using it to illustrate his statement that "[t]he
Ninth Circuit has not explicitly ruled on the issue before this court." See Appellant's Brief
at 13 n. 6, Hart v. Massanari, sub nom. Hart v. Apfel, filed Dec. 13, 1999 (citing Rice v.
Chater, No. 95-35604, 1996 WL 583605 (9th Cir., Oct. 9, 1996) (reported in Decisions
Without Published Opinions, 98 F.3d 1346 tbl. (9th Cir. 1996)). Judge Kozinski did not
consider arguments of history or common law practice that might make the rule
unconstitutional in prohibiting the mere citation of an unpublished opinion, which the
attorney in Hart was doing, as distinct from application of the rule to deny an unpublished
opinion the force of binding precedent, which was not involved in Hart.
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question, ° and almost as an afterthought 6' addressed the rule'sS • 62
ban on citation. At this point, moreover, his argument (to
which I'll return) exchanged history and constitutional principle
for wholly prudential considerations.
Nevertheless, much of what Judge Kozinski says in his
discussion of binding precedent seems quite relevant to no-
citation rules. Backhandedly, Judge Kozinski provides a fresh
and cogent rationale for regarding those rules as inconsistent
with the common law tradition and with modern federal
practice. In the course of arguing that the principle of "strict
binding precedent ' 63 is not constitutionally compelled, Judge
Kozinski goes a long way toward demonstrating that the
principle of citable precedent may be.
Consider two examples:
(1) In his discussion of history and the Constitution, Judge
Kozinski writes:
While we agree with Anastasoff that the principle of
precedent was well established in the common law courts
by the time Article III of the Constitution was written, we
do not agree that it was known and applied in the strict
sense in which we apply binding authority today .... The
concept of binding case precedent, though it was known at
common law, was used exceedingly sparingly. For the most
part, common law courts felt free to depart from precedent
where they considered the earlier-adopted rule to be no
longer workable or appropriate.
Case precedent at common law thus resembled much more
what we call persuasive authority than the binding
authority which is the backbone of much of the federal
judicial system today.64
Judge Kozinski thus appears to say that "the principle of
precedent was well established" when the Constitution was
60. Together, the terms "binding authority" and "binding precedent" appear forty-five
times in the twenty-two page opinion.
61. On page twenty of the twenty-two-page opinion.
62. 266 F.3d at 1178.
63. Id. at 1164.
64. Id. at 1174-1175 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1165 n. 13
("[C]ommon law judges knew the distinction between binding and persuasive precedent.
The vast majority of precedents at common law were considered more or less
persuasive....").
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written, but that it "resembled much more what we call
persuasive authority" than it did "binding authority." Does this
not suggest that a principle akin to persuasive authority may
have been embodied in Article III, or at least in the "common
law traditions" that federal courts follow?65  Given the
distinguished common law pedigree that Judge Kozinski credits
to the principle of persuasive authority, one might have expected
him to consider that principle before upholding a rule that
prohibits lawyers from citing court decisions they claim to be
persuasive. While Judge Kozinski writes that "common law
judges knew the distinction between binding and persuasive
precedent," 66 he himself seems to rub out that distinction.
(2) In discussing the common law tradition, Judge Kozinski
writes:
Federal courts today do follow some common law
traditions. When ruling on a novel issue of law, they will
generally consider how other courts have ruled on the same
issue.
Citing a precedent is, of course, not the same as following
it; "respectfully disagree" within five words of "learned
colleagues" is almost a cliche.... While we would
consider it bad form to ignore contrary authority by failing
even to acknowledge its existence, it is well understood
that-in the absence of binding precedent-courts may
forge a different path than suggested by prior authorities
that have considered the issue. So long as the earlier
authority is acknowledged and considered, courts are
deemed to have complied with their common law
responsibilities. 67
When a rule prohibits citation of unpublished opinions,
does that not require courts to "ignore contrary authority by
failing even to acknowledge its existence"? If an earlier
authority cannot be cited to the court, it cannot be
"acknowledged and considered" by the court; hence, it would
65. See 266 F.3d at 1169 ("Federal courts today do follow some common law
traditions.").
66. Id. at 1165 n. 13.
67. Id. at 1169-1170 (emphasis added).
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seem, courts have not "complied with their common law
responsibilities." It is hard to see why these considerations of
judicial responsibility should not have been considered in Hart
as bearing on the validity of the Ninth Circuit's no-citation rule.
The case against no-citation rules asks not that unpublished
opinions be regarded as binding precedents, or as precedents at
all in the normative, stare decisis sense. It asks only that they be
acknowledged and considered. 6' This obligation serves the ends
of fairness and consistency, assuring that the prior decision not
be rejected without on-the-record consideration and explanation.
It is a lesser requirement than the "burden of justification" that
Judge Arnold considers necessary for overruling a prior
decision. 69 But it serves the same purpose, assuring that when the
law changes, it does so "in response to the dictates of reason,
and not because judges have simply changed their minds." 70 It is
one thing to tell a litigant she lost her case because the court
reconsidered and rejected a prior opinion that was in her favor; it
is another thing to tell her she lost her case under a rule that
barred her lawyer from telling the court about that prior opinion.
As Judge Kozinski says, it is "bad form to ignore contrary
authority by failing even to acknowledge its existence."71 Why
is it bad form? Because, at bottom, it disrespects the principle of
precedent on which our court-made law is based, and hence
dishonors the rule of law itself. Judge Kozinski's articulation of
the need to "acknowledge and consider" prior decisions thus
provides an apt and cogent rationale for rejecting no-citation
rules.72
68. On this point Judge Kozinski and Judge Arnold seem to agree. Judge Arnold rejects
the courts' message that "you cannot even tell us what we did yesterday," while Judge
Kozinski insists that earlier authority be "acknowledged and considered." See Anastasoff,
223 F.3d at 904; Hart, 266 F.3d at 1170.
69. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905.
70. Id.
71. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1170.
72. The relevant difference can be seen in two recent cases in which federal appeals
panels refused to follow unpublished opinions, provoking dissents based on Anastasoff, In
Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc
denied, 256 F.3d 260 (2001), a Fifth Circuit panel held that DART was not an arm of the
State of Texas for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, in the face of three prior
unpublished dispositions to the contrary. The unpublished opinions were cited to the panel,
under the Fifth Circuit rule allowing citation as "persuasive authority," see supra n. 21,
and the panel discussed them in a lengthy footnote, finding them unpersuasive. 242 F.3d at
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IV. VANISHING TIME: THE KoZINSKI DEFENSE OF No-CITATION
RULES
When Judge Kozinski ultimately moves in Hart from
whether unpublished opinions are binding authority to whether
they are citable, he departs from his earlier consideration of
history, common law practice, and "persuasive precedent" and
makes an argument that is wholly prudential. "Should courts
allow parties to cite to these dispositions," Judge Kozinski
writes, "much of the time gained [from not having to write
precedential opinions in every case] would likely vanish. 73 In
support of this conclusion Judge Kozinski offers two arguments,
one based on the additional time that judges (and their staffs)
assertedly would need to produce opinions worthy of citation,
the other stressing the extra time that judges and lawyers
assertedly would need to research and process those opinions
once produced. Both are legitimate concerns--especially for the
Ninth Circuit, with the highest case volume of any federal
circuit. 4 Both concerns, however, appear exaggerated.
Judge Kozinski first argues that if unpublished opinions
could be cited, "conscientious judges would have to pay much
closer attention to the way they word their unpublished rulings.
Language adequate to inform the parties how their case has been
318-319 n. 1. Three judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, saying the court
should "revisit the questionable practice of denying precedential status to unpublished
opinions." 256 F.3d at 260 (Smith, Jones & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting).
In Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 277
F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002), a divided panel upheld a defense of laches to a claim of patent
infringement, contrary to two prior non-precedential opinions of the Federal Circuit. (The
court "reluctantly" permitted those opinions to be discussed despite the Circuit's no-
citation rule, see 277 F.3d at 1370 (Newman, J., dissenting).) While the defendant argued
that the court was bound by those opinions, citing Anastasoff, the majority agreed instead
with Judge Kozinski in Hart. It thus concluded: "[W]e decline to consider" the opinions.
277 F.3d at 1368. The dissenting judge agreed that the opinions were not binding, but
found them worth considering at some length. 277 F.3d at 1370.
While Williams and Symbol both declined to follow unpublished opinions, they
differ crucially. The Fifth Circuit considered the opinions and rejected them, while the
Federal Circuit "decline[d] to consider" them. The Federal Circuit's failure even to
acknowledge and consider the opinions was, in Judge Kozinski's term, "bad form," Hart,
266 F.3d at 1170; it may also have been unconstitutional. See Katsh & Chachkes, supra
nn. 41, 56; Velasquez, 531 U.S. at 545.
73. 266 F.3d at 1178.
74. And especially for Judge Kozinski, whose superb published opinions are worth all
the time he can put into them.
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decided might well be inadequate if applied to future cases
arising from different facts." 75  Further, "[w]ithout
comprehensive factual accounts and precisely crafted holdings
to guide them, zealous counsel would be tempted to seize upon
superficial similarities between their clients' cases and
unpublished dispositions." 7 6 This exaltation of judges' language
not only harks back to Legal Realism, as Judge Danny J. Boggs
and Brian P. Brooks have pointed out.77 It also ignores what we
all were taught in the first year of law school:7" that the law is
not what the judges say-that's dictum; it's what they decide.
Although imprecise language indeed may mask the true facts of
a case, law clerks and staff attorneys are good at stating facts-
they do it often enough in published opinions-and lawyers and
judges have abundant experience in distinguishing cases on their
facts. When a lawyer cites an unpublished opinion, it is less
likely to be because of its language than because the facts of that
case are closer to those in the case before the court than are the
facts of any case decided with a published opinion.7 9 As Judge
Richard Posner, himself a backer of no-citation rules, has
conceded: "Despite the vast number of published opinions, most
federal circuit judges will confess that a surprising fraction of
federal appeals, at least in civil cases, are difficult to decide not
because there are too many precedents but because there are two
few on point."8 ° When a lawyer finds one of those few
precedents on point, why shouldn't she be allowed to tell the
court about it?
Judge Kozinski further predicts that court time will be lost
because "publishing redundant opinions will multiply
significantly the number of inadvertent and unnecessary
conflicts," since "different opinion writers may use slightly
different language to express the same idea."' And under the
75. 266 F.3d at 1178.
76. Id.
77. Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of
Precedent, 4 Green Bag 2d 17, 22 (2001).
78. Even, I'm told, at Yale.
79. Circuit rules so require. See e.g. 4th Cir. R. 36(c) (allowing citation of unpublished
opinion only if "there is no published opinion that would serve as well").
80. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 166 (Harvard U.
Press 1996).
81. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1179.
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law-of-the-circuit rule, "conflicts-even inadvertent ones-can
only be resolved by the exceedingly time-consuming and
inefficient process of en banc review." 2
Whatever the apparent conflicts in judicial language,
though, circuit judges surely are expert at distinguishing cases
on their facts. (Take a look at almost any unsuccessful petition
for rehearing en banc.) And for true intra-circuit conflicts
involving unpublished opinions, en banc review is not the only
remedy. Others are-as I'll consider shortly-(a) making
unpublished opinions citable for their "persuasive" value only,
and (b) lifting the law-of-the-circuit rule for unpublished
opinions, so they can be overruled by subsequent panels in
published opinions.83
Furthermore, any diversion of judicial time that might
originally have resulted from allowing citation of unpublished
opinions may already have occurred, thanks to the availability of
those opinions on line, in LEXIS and Westlaw, and now in
West's Federal Appendix. Indeed, the entire controversy over
unpublished opinions may be laid at the feet of LEXIS,
Westlaw, and the Internet, with their technological capacity to
make everything available; the issue would not have come up, at
least not with anything like its present force, in the world of
books.' With the online cat now out of the bag, judges know
82. Id.
83. Judge Kozinski sees yet another drain on judicial time under a citable-opinion
regime resulting from an increase in dissenting and concurring opinions: "Although three
judges might agree on the outcome of the case before them, they might not agree on the
precise reasoning of the rule to be applied to future cases," and hence "[u]npublished
concurrences and dissents would become much more common." 266 F.3d at 1178. A
survey of Volume 27 of the Federal Appendix (the latest one available as I write) yields the
following figures. Among the 220 cases reported from circuits where citation is permitted,
there were four dissents or concurrences, representing 1.8 percent of the cases. Among the
149 cases reported from circuits where citation of unpublished cases is banned, there were
likewise four dissents or concurrences, representing 2.7 percent of the cases. The "citable"
circuits thus had a lower rate of dissenting or concurring opinions than the "noncitable"
circuits. Further, among the eighty-two cases reported from the Ninth Circuit, there were
four dissents or concurrences, or 4.9 percent. The only other dissents or concurrences were
from the (citable) Fourth and Sixth Circuits, which had two such opinions each (among
forty-five and 116 reported cases, respectively). The rates of dissenting or concurring
opinions thus were 4.4 percent in the Fourth Circuit and 1.7 percent in the Sixth-both
figures lower than the 4.9 percent in the noncitable Ninth Circuit. Although admittedly
limited, these data are inconsistent with Judge Kozinski's hypothesis that making the
opinions citable increases the rate of dissents and concurrences.
84. I owe this observation to Bob Berring.
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that their opinions, designated for publication or not, are going
to be read, collected, and analyzed.85 In most federal circuits,
moreover, they may be cited. Since the sky has not fallen in
those circuits, one may conclude that allowing citation not only
recognizes a technological fait accompli, but need not produce
the dire results that Judge Kozinski fears.
Judge Kozinski's second argument is based on the
resources assertedly needed to research and process the
unpublished opinions if they are citable. " [A]dding endlessly to
the body of precedent-especially binding precedent-can lead
to confusion and unnecessary conflict," he writes." The primary
victims would be lawyers and their clients:
Cases decided by nonprecedential disposition generally
involve facts that are materially indistinguishable from
those of prior published opinions. Writing a second, third or
tenth opinion in the same area of the law, based on
materially indistinguishable facts, will, at best, clutter up
the law books and databases with redundant and thus
unhelpful authority. Yet once they are designated as
precedent, they will have to be read and analyzed by
lawyers researching the issue, materially increasing the
costs to the client for absolutely no legitimate reason.
If a case involves facts "materially indistinguishable" from
those of prior published opinions, one wonders in the first place
why it was appealed.8" And if it was, one wonders why a
lawyer-wanting to make her best arguments and facing a page
limit on briefs-would cite the unpublished opinion instead of a
published one.89 In any event, the law books and legal databases
85. See U.S. v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) ("While our
present circuit rules prohibit the citation of unpublished memorandum dispositions,
[citation omitted] we are mindful of the fact that they are readily available in on line legal
databases such as Westlaw and Lexis"); Katsh & Chachkes, supra n. 41, at 301-302 (" [I]n
practice, citation prohibitions hardly ease the case-review burden on the prudent
practitioner." ).
86. 266 F.3d at 1179.
87. Id.
88. See Katsh & Chachkes, supra n. 41, at 301 ("[T]he myth that there exist great
batches of redundant unpublished appellate cases is true only in certain discrete areas of
law where meritless cases are litigated even to appeal-e.g., cases involving prisoners and
social security claimants," and even if those cases were citable, courts and practitioners
"would understand... that the case law is well settled" ).
89. Especially since such citation likely would violate a circuit rule. See supra n. 79.
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already are "clutter[ed] up" with unpublished opinions, which
many lawyers now routinely research whether they are citable or
not.9° And it seems not insignificant that lawyers themselves
tend to be strongly opposed to no-citation rules.9'
While Judge Kozinski's fears thus seem overstated, they do
give pause. This is especially so for the Ninth Circuit, which
issues some 4,100 unpublished opinions per year." But that is
not so many more than the 3,500 issued by the Eleventh Circuit,
or the 3,200 by the Fifth-opinions that in both circuits are
citable. 9' With eight circuits now allowing citation, the burden of
proof would seem to lie with those who say that citability cannot
be acceptably managed.
V. WHAT PRECEDENTIAL FORCE FOR UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS?
If unpublished opinions are to be citable, the question
remains, what degree of "precedential" force should they carry?
I see three possibilities: (1) binding precedent, fully subject to
the law-of-the-circuit rule and thus overrulable only by the en
banc court; (2) "persuasive" authority that is "not precedent,"
and hence not subject to the law-of-the-circuit rule; and (3) a
new "overrulable" status based on lifting the law-of-the-circuit
rule to allow panel overruling of a prior panel's unpublished
opinion, but only if the second panel does so in a published
opinion.
90. See Katsh & Chachkes, supra n. 41, at 301-302 (observing that prudent
practitioners research uncitable cases "to mine them for new ideas," because they indicate
how a court has ruled in past and thus might rule in future, and because they "still may
influence a court that reads (or remembers deciding) them itself').
91. See ABA Resolution, supra n. 4; see also Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra n. 36, at 43
("At bench and bar meetings, lawyers complain at length about being denied this fertile
source of authority. Our Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which is
composed mostly of lawyers who practice before the court, regularly proposes that
memdispos be citable. When we refuse, lawyers grumble that we just don't understand
their problem"). A court official in a circuit in which unpublished opinions are not citable
reports "a lot of clamor" to allow citation. Telephone Interview with circuit official (May
8, 2002). (Of course, the lawyers may just want to pad their bills, but that seems a
questionable conclusion for a court to draw a priori.)
92. Judicial Business of the United States Courts, supra n. 26.
93. Id. It is true that they are not posted online or given to legal publishers. But they are
citable by rule and, apparently, cited in practice. See supra nn. 12, 21, 24, 28.
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1. Unpublished opinions, in my view, should not be
regarded as binding precedents, or otherwise as equivalent to
published opinions. Judge Kozinski has shown in Hart that the
Constitution does not require that all precedents be viewed as
binding. Of the eight circuits that allow citation of unpublished
opinions, none treat them as full-fledged, first-class, binding
precedents. All eight circuits discourage citation of these
opinions, and four of the eight-the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits-declare that they are "not precedents" and
may be cited only for their "persuasive" value.
Treating unpublished opinions as second-class
precedents-but, of course, citable ones-is readily defended.
Just as the Supreme Court gives "less deference" to its
summary dispositions than to cases decided with briefing,
argument, and a full opinion,94 no reason appears why a court of
appeals may not devote less of its time and attention to a
designated class of opinions and accordingly treat those opinions
as having less precedential weight than others. The legitimate
caseload concerns support at least this much adjustment of
judicial technique. And there is little danger of deception or
surprise in allowing citation. An "unpublished" opinion, even
when published in the Federal Appendix, wears a scarlet "U";
no one should be surprised to discover that it carries less
authority than a "published" opinion.95
2. If citable unpublished opinions are not to be binding
precedents, some way must be found to free them from the law-
of-the-circuit rule, which says a panel opinion is binding on all
subsequent panels. The easiest way out would appear to lie in
the approach presently taken by the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits; these courts declare unpublished opinions to
be "not precedent" (or "not binding precedent") and citable
only for their "persuasive" value. Under this regime, the law-of-
the-circuit rule apparently does not apply to unpublished
94. See supra n. 45.
95. See supra n. 9 (citation restrictions in Federal Appendix). Indeed, citation of
unpublished opinions makes clear their unpublished status and avoids confusion that may
otherwise result. Cf. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d at 1063 (citing unpublished opinions
superseded by court's (published) decision "[t]o avoid even the possibility that someone
might rely upon them").
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opinions, because they are not "precedents." 96 The "persuasive
authority" approach thus enables a circuit panel to reject an
unpublished opinion as unpersuasive-with reasons, of course-
without having to take the case en banc or otherwise to formally
overrule the opinion. This approach can claim an extensive
historical and common law pedigree, as Judge Kozinski
demonstrates in Hart. It also has a familiar administrative-law
analogue in Skidmore deference.97 In sum, there is much to be
said for the persuasive-authority approach.
3. The other approach would accord unpublished opinions
"precedential" status that requires overruling, but would lift the
law-of-the-circuit rule to let subsequent panels overrule them. In
the D. C. Circuit, which now allows citation of unpublished
opinions "as precedent," and possibly in the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits, which allow citation for "precedential value," it
apparently follows today that an unpublished opinion found to
meet these tests becomes the law of the circuit and hence cannot
be overruled by another panel. 98 The proposed approach would
alter the law-of-the-circuit rule to allow a citable unpublished
opinion to be overruled by a subsequent panel, as long as the
subsequent panel did so in a published opinion.
A circuit apparently would have power to revise its rules
this way. While it has been suggested that the law-of-the-circuit
rule rests on constitutional,99 or at least statutory, ° compulsion,
96. See In re: United States of America, 60 F.3d 729, 732 (11th Cir. 1995) (cited
unpublished opinion is "not law of this circuit and will not be binding on any future
panel"). (The Eleventh Circuit's Rule 36-2, allowing citation as "persuasive authority,"
see supra n. 24, was in effect in 1995. Telephone Interview with 11 th Cir. official (May 7,
2002)).
97. See supra n. 48.
98. But see Sixth Cir. cases cited supra n. 44.
99. See Katsch & Chachkes, supra n. 41, at 288 n. 5 (pointing out that Anastasoff
assumes law-of-circuit rule is constitutionally required and refuting that assumption). •
100. The court in LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996), described
the law-of-the-circuit rule as "derived from legislation and from the structure" of the
federal circuits. But the court's quotation of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), stating that the circuits
normally sit in panels, or divisions, of" 'not more than three judges,"' and its quotation of
the Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 46, stating that "the 'decision of a division' is the
'decision of the court,"' 87 F.3d at 1395, do not appear to make the case. The Revision
Notes state that the new statutory language "preserves the interpretation established by"
Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commr., 314 U.S. 326 (1941)-which held that circuits may sit
en banc, and not only in three-judge panels. But, the Notes continue, the new language
provides normally for three-judge panels and "makes the decision of a division, the
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neither appears to be the case."" And such modification would
promote, not subvert, the rule's purpose of avoiding intra-circuit
conflicts: As between two conflicting panel decisions, it would
be clear which one governed-the one that was published.
Panels thus would not have to resort to finespun factual
distinctions or aggressive claims of dictum in order to avoid the
force of an unpublished precedent with which they disagreed.
They could simply overrule it, if willing to do so in a published
opinion. Such an approach also accords with the responsibilities
of law-making. If the issuing panel did not consider its decision
important enough to publish and make into law, why should that
panel's opinion be binding on another panel which, having duly
considered it, comes out differently and is willing to make its
opinion into law? As between the two panels, the one that is
consciously making law, that is willing to put its precedential
money where its mouth is, ought to prevail.
Lifting the law-of-the-circuit rule thus seems desirable for
circuits in which citable unpublished opinions are regarded as
"precedents" and thus might invoke the rule. It might well also
be done by circuits taking the "persuasive" -authority approach.
While that approach allows a panel to deem a prior, unpublished
panel opinion "unpersuasive" without overruling it, there will
be cases in which the subsequent panel thinks the prior opinion
should be formally overruled. '° When a panel desires to
overrule an unpublished opinion by a published one, it should
not have to go en banc.
For circuits deciding between "persuasive" authority and
precedent," the "persuasive" approach might be better for
large circuits, where volume argues for giving less weight to
unpublished authority. For any circuit, moreover, the
decision of the court, unless rehearing in banc is ordered." The issue to which this
quotation was directed thus was the size of the panel in which the judges would sit, three
judges or en banc, and not the relationship between panels. The Court's concern in Textile
Mills, paraphrased in LaShawn A., that "[wiere matters otherwise, the finality of our
appellate decisions would yield to constant conflicts within the circuit," 87 F.3d at 1395,
was expressed in support of the Court's holding that en banc courts were permissible. See
Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 335. The statement was not made in support of an argument that
en bancs could be avoided by application of the law-of-the-circuit rule.
101. See supra nn. 99-100.
102. Cf. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d at 1063 (unpublished opinions affected by decision
not citable but court nonetheless lists them as "superseded").
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"persuasive" approach has the virtue of providing a brighter
line, one making clear that unpublished opinions, though citable,
are in a class by themselves, and thus reducing the uncertainty
involved in having different levels of "precedential" authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Kozinski's opinion in Hart shoots down Anastasoff s
claim that unpublished opinions must be binding precedents, but
simultaneously demonstrates that they must be citable. The
arguments of history and common law tradition that Judge
Kozinski invokes, particularly his insistence that earlier
authority be "acknowledged and considered," confirm the
essential role of precedent in our law and undermine the case for
no-citation rules. Advancing technology is compelling the same
result. In all but two federal circuits, unpublished opinions now
are available not only on line, but also in West's Federal
Appendix, a published reporter of unpublished opinions that is
worthy of Alice in Wonderland. It is no wonder that a majority
of the federal circuits, recognizing reality, now allow citation of
their unpublished opinions.
While rules permitting citation of these decisions thus seem
inevitable, it does not follow that unpublished opinions should
be treated as binding precedents, or as precedents at all in the
stare decisis sense. They may be citable only for their
"persuasive" value. And even where they are regarded as
precedents, the circuits should lift their law-of-the-circuit rules
so that unpublished opinions may be overruled by published
panel opinions. The better choice, probably, is to treat
unpublished opinions as citable only for their persuasive value.
Whatever the degree of deference to be accorded
unpublished opinions, the arguments for making them citable
seem likely to carry the day. These arguments combine the
claims of fairness, due process, public access, and respect for
law itself with a new technological reality that is transforming
the terms of the debate. As it becomes increasingly difficult to
use the term "unpublished" with a straight face, the necessary
replacement becomes the candid "uncitable." The power of
courts to issue uncitable opinions is difficult to defend, and the
task will only get harder as the opinions become more
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accessible. Powerful as the federal courts may be, they cannot
hold back this wave.
